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4. 1 Background and Concepts
4.1.1 Introduction
As argued in chapter 3, there is sufficient evidence to establish that business
contractions were on the whole shorter and milder after 1948 than before
World Wars I and II. A comparison ofstandard historical estimates and recent
data also suggests that the geneFal price changes were more volatile and more
cyclical in the earlier periods. 1 Inflation has prevailed since 1950, and gener-
ally procyclical movements in the rate of inflation have replaced the earlier
procyclical fluctuations in the price level. Thus, the age of reduced cyclical
instability was also an age of increased downward rigidity of prices (and, it
will be shown, money wages). This presents a problem because the classical
and still prevailing view in the profession is that stickier wages and prices
make the real economy more unstable.
In large part, the voluminous and rapidly expanding literature on "micro-
foundations" of macroeconomics consists of attempts to rationalize why
wages do not adjust promptly and fully to changes in the demand for labor,
and prices to changes in the demand for output. But great differences in the
degree ofprice and wage flexibility (or stickiness) are found in historical stud-
ies and cross-sectional and cross-country comparisons (see, e.g., Sachs 1979,
1. This is strongly supported by the available long wholesale price series (Zamowitz and Moore
1986, sec. 9.10; chapter 3, fig. 3.2 and table 3.1, in this volume). Consumer prices have always
been much less variable, and here the change in behavior is subject to doubt. The standard esti-
mates for the GNPdeflator may have greatly overstated the historical price volatility by using only
wholesale and not consumer prices (Balke and Gordon 1989, pp. 71-75). However, even con-
sumer prices responded with significant declines to some of the business contractions ofthe past
(see, e.g., Zamowitz and Moore 1986, fig. 1), whereas after 1949 neither producer nor consumer
price levels did.
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1980; Branson and Rotemberg 1980; Gordon 1982a, 1983; Bruno and Sachs
1985; P. Andersen 1989). Apparently, business cycles coexist with a broad
range of behavior in labor and product markets, though they may influence,
and be influenced by, changes in that behavior. It is these interactions that
should ultimately be of primary interest to students of macroeconomic per-
formance and policy, not a postulated dichotomy of flexprice and fixprice
models.
For good reasons, however, little is known as yet about what causes what
here. Macroeconomics deals with a limited number ofaggregate variables and
potential sources of overall growth and instability; it finds it exceedingly dif-
ficult to deal with an evolving economy and heterogeneity ofmarket firms and
participants. Yet it is useful to ask how the main contemporary hypotheses
bearing on business cycles and broadly defined price flexibility are related to
each other. I will attempt to answer this question by selectively reviewing
work in this area and assessing its major implications and problems in the
light ofstatistical and historical evidence.
4.1.2 Hypotheses ofWage and Price Inertia
For a long time Keynesian macroeconomics focused on the inflexibility of
nominal wages rather than prices as the main link between fluctuations in
demand and output. But ifit were typically the case that prices fall or rise less
in business contractions while money wages continue to rise faster than
prices, then real wages should tend to be countercyclical. This is simply not
consistent with the evidence, as reviewed below.
Further, labor compensation is the largest component of both total income
and cost of output, so high rigidity of wages would induce high rigidity of
prices, which would at some point be inconsistent with the degree of effi-
ciency in resource allocation expected of the market economy. The premise
that nominal wages are unresponsive to cyclical demand fluctuations must be
examined rather than maintained. It would seem more plausible to expect that
money wage rates will on the average rise faster than the value ofthe marginal
product of labor in periods of high employment and will rise more slowly or
even decline in periods of low employment. The tendency for real wage
changes to reflect productivity changes would then manifest itself mainly in
the long run.
To be sure, a competitive firm will not knowingly pay real product wages
in excess ofthe employee's marginal product, except transitionally and when
it expects to recoup its short-term loss in the longer run. Similarly, the worker
will not knowingly accept less than his or her marginal product, except under
analogous circumstances. So any discrepancies between wages and productiv-
ity must be due to any or all of the following: (1) lack of knowledge by the
firm, the worker, or both ofwhat the relevant marginal products currently are;
(2) uncertainty about the economic conditions facing the firm and the workers;127 Cyclical Aspects ofCost and Price Movements
and (3) departures from competition, mainly in the direction of bargaining
between large oligopolistic companies and large labor unions.
Conditions (1) and (2) are probably of long standing. However, productiv-
ity is particularly difficult to assess in various service industries, such as fi-
nance, insurance, trade, health, and education, and also in professions and
sales, clerical, technical, and managerial occupations. Many of these areas
have gained greatly in relative importance in recent times. Some large shifts
oftype (3) certainly occurred as well, but so did important countermovements
in the direction ofmore global competition.
Research confirms the common observation that few labor markets are of
the competitive auction type, where nominal wage adjustments clear the mar-
ket continuously. Explicit contracts negotiated by unions and corporations de-
termine wages oforganized laborover staggered periods of1-3 years. Implicit
contracts whose durations run over years fix wages and salaries of career job
holders. Here current compensation is an installment payment on a long-term
employment relationship. It is often in the best interest ofboth employer and
employee to maintain such an association on multivariate terms that are not
very responsive to changes in general economic conditions considered transi-
tory. 2
Contractual arrangements between buyer and seller also exist in product
markets, at least for limited time periods, and they tend to be associated with
low frequency and small average size of price changes. But some prices re-
main unchanged over long time periods even where no such contracts exist
(e.g., newstand prices of magazines; see Cecchetti 1986). There is evidence
that product prices in many industries, particularly those that are more con-
centrated, change only infrequently. 3
All this explains why the emphasis on wage rigidity gave way to more at-
tention to price rigidity in recent years. The shift suggests the general notion
that the main reason why workers lose jobs in recessions is not that real wages
rise but that prices do not fall even though sales do. Also, it recognizes that,
up to a point, prices can decline despite temporarily sticky wages when al-
lowed by some combination of gains in productivity and reductions in nonla-
bor costs and profit margins.
4.1.3 Real and Nominal Rigidities
In the business cycle context, it is particularly important to ask how
changes in the aggregate demand for real output (Q) influence the levels of
2. For a critical review ofthe writings on implicit contracts, see Rosen 1985. On the "stylized
facts" and theories ofthe labor market, see Parsons 1986; Stiglitz 1986; and Kniesner and Gold-
smith 1987.
3. See Carlton 1986. Other comprehensive studies ofprice adjustment and surveys ofthe large
and growing literature include R. J. Gordon 1981, 1983; Blanchard 1987aand 1987b; Rotemberg
1987; Ball, Mankiw, and Romer 1988.128 Chapter Four
nominal prices and wages (P, W). If P does not react promptly or fully to a
change in Q, at any given level of W, there is some real price rigidity. Analo-
gously, if W does not react promptly or fully to a change in Q, at any P, there
is some real wage rigidity. These partial adjustments involve changes in price-
over-wage markups or real wages. They are complemented by interactions
between changes in P and W, given Q. IfP does not react promptly or fully to
a change in W, there is some nominal price rigidity; in the opposite case, there
is some nominal wage rigidity.
One way to formalize this double dichotomy and isolate the parameters that
embody each of these rigidities, as implemented in Blanchard 1987a, is to




p = f.LW + exq,
Here q might be represented by output in equation (1) and by employment in
equation (2). Each variable (p, w, and q) involves a lag polynomial applied to
the logarithms of levels, or alternatively to log differences (e.g., p =a(L)P
or p = a'(L)DP). The smaller the values of f.L and'll, the greater the nominal
price and wage rigidities, and the smaller the values of ex and ~, the greater
the real price and wage rigidities. Unless f.L = 1, p does not adjust fully to
changes in w, and the same applies, mutatis mutandis, to'll, ex, and ~. De-
pending on the time frame and type of analysis, the adjustments can dif-
fer with respect to both how complete (or partial) and how fast (or slow)
they are. 4
To close this simple model, it is necessary to make q a function of some
exogenous factors. Keynes attributed business cycles to shifts in real aggre-
gate demand, due mainly to instability of investment. In contrast, contempo-
rary models that bear the broad Keynesian label relate the cycles to shifts in
nominal aggregate demand, due mainly to instability of money supply. Given
this orientation, q is often taken to be proportional to real balances (m - p),
where m is the log of the nominal money stock. Realistically, however, q
should be thought ofas depending on both monetary factors and nonmonetary
ones (e.g., shifts in government spending and taxes, exports).
There are many good reasons for some degree of inertia in the response of
relative wages and prices to changes in real demand. Some but not all ofthese
explanations require major deviations from the basic competitive model. On
the other hand, the problem of nominal rigidities simply does not arise under
perfect competition. Suppose a sudden tightening of monetary policy causes
4. Blanchard (1987a) constrains the estimates so that p and w react to each other fully in the
long run, but this restriction may not be appropriate (see comment by Sims on his paper).129 Cyclical Aspects of Cost and Price Movements
a fall in aggregate demand, while no change occurs in technology or prefer-
ences. Under the classical competitive paradigm, since the equilibrium struc-
ture of prices remains unaltered, all nominal prices must decline proportion-
ately. It is only in this way that the previous equilibrium levels ofreal money
balances and real economic activity can be restored (or, rather, maintained:
the process is executed promptly and smoothly by continuous price changes
directed from open auction markets at atomistic agents).
4.2 Why Are Wages Not More Responsive to Declines in Demand?
4.2.1 Relative Wages and Efficiency Wages
For Keynes (1936, chs. 2 and 19), the idea that marks a key departure from
"classical economics" is that labor is an aggregate consisting of groups that,
whether or not formally organized, have as their main objective the protection
of their relative real wages. Each group watches the others it compares itself
with and bargains to obtain a possible advantage but at least not to fall behind.
Thus, in a depression any group will resist an attempt to reduce its money
wage. Although a uniform across-the-board wage cut may then be acceptable
to labor, there is no practical way to engineer it in a diversified economy in
which there is some dispersion of market power. The stickiness of relative
earnings thus translates into a stickiness of nominal wage rates in general.
Moreover, such partial reductions in these rates as come about are apt to do
more harm than good, because they contribute to the spread of deflationary
expectations and inhibit spending. In contrast, reflationary policies, by raising
the price level and so lowering real wages overall, can provide the needed
adjustments without disturbing the wage structure in ways to which labor ob-
jects.
If relative wages are what matters to groups of workers, then the net pro-
ductivity of labor should be a positive function of these wages. In a suffi-
ciently strong form, this relationship implies that a decline of real wages
below a certain norm is associated with higher, not lower, unit labor costs.
Here the old emphasis on the dependence ofwages on productivity is replaced
by a new emphasis on the reverse causation, the dependence of productiv-
ity on wages. Stiglitz (1986, pp. 182-92; 1987) provides the model for this
analysis; for criticisms and references, see Katz 1986 and Murphy and Topel
1989.
Suppose that as the real wage ofthe ith labor group, Wi' increases up to w;,
the productivity of the group, ~i' rises more than proportionately, while a
further increase in Wi is associated with less than proportionate gains in ~i'
Hence the cost per effective unit oflabor service is U-shaped with a minimum
at w;. The firm that employs ith labor will pay the "efficiency wage" w; with
the intention ofminimizing unit labor costs; it will not extend employment to130 Chapter Four
people who offer their services at a lower wage, because it believes that this
would reduce productivity and raise costs. The unemployed cannot underbid
the "insiders" if they are viewed as sufficiently less productive or likely to
raise the effective costs oflabor to the firm.
Efficiency wages could be paid for any or all of several reasons, but prob-
lems arise for each ofthese variants
1. Let the perceived relative wage determine each employee's effort and
indeed willingness to work. This may be viewed as an individualistic version
ofKeynes's notion that any labor group is averse to a reduction in its nominal
wage, which is inevitably a relative wage cut. A self-validating convention of
this kind could in principle generate a pervasive downward stickiness of
wages in a decentralized market economy. But historically money wages fell
in depressions, and wage concessions are not uncommon even during shorter
and less severe contractions (as in the early 1980s). Considerations offairness
may well be very important, but economic self-interest should be stronger
still. High unemployment will increase the value of holding a job and the
incentive to work hard. Should prices fall more than wages, as they did in the
early 1930s, these motivations will be further enhanced, and the role ofrela-
tive wages could well be greatly diminished.
2. In the modern versions ofthe theory, it is not labor's resistance to lower
wages that is stressed but rather management's strategy to give workers incen-
tives in the form ofrelatively high earnings and benefits. The idea is that this
is required to attract and keep high-quality employees and have them work at
high levels of effort. Well-paid workers are less prone to search, quit, or join
a union and exercise more bargaining power collectively. As a result, the firm
will benefit from lower labor turnover costs. But the high-wage option is not
the only one that is available here, and it need not be optimal; for example,
offers of greater training and promotion opportunities or greater job security
may be more attractive to some firms and workers.
3. The efficiency wages wiare set by firms with some (perhaps only infor-
mationally based and short-run) monopsony or oligopsony powers in the labor
markets. It is not clear how important empirically such conditions are. In the
resulting interior solution, small deviations of wages from long-term equilib-
rium cause only second-order losses to the firm, so that nonadjustment of
wages to minor shocks is "near-rational" (Akerlof and Yellen 1985). Here the
effect ofefficiency wages is to decrease the fluctuations in wages and increase
those in employment.
4. Shirking and negligence can cause large damages to firms, particularly
where many workers perform sensitive tasks using complex machinery and
equipment (so can fraud and stealing, which may be more diffuse). The detec-
tion of such misconduct is taken to be costly in the so-called primary (high-
wage) sector ofthe labor market, but not in the secondary (low-wage) sector.
Hence, the primary jobs pay a premium above the market-clearing wage for
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ability (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Bulow and Summers 1986). Critics point
out that superior market-clearing solutions for the shirking problem exist in
the form of explicit or implicit contracts that involve performance bonds
posted by employees. 5
4.2.2 Implications for Unemployment and Some Evidence
To rationalize involuntary unemployment in the sense of excess supply of
labor, a theory must rule out the existence of a sufficiently attractive and ex-
pandable flexible-wage sector. In the model with dual labor markets, workers
in the secondary market have menial jobs with low prospects and high turn-
over. This acts as a reputational barrier against the employment ofthese work-
ers in the primary market. The unemployment in this scenario is mainly fric-
tional and long term, due to the high incidence ofquits and separations in the
secondary sector and to the job rationing and queues in the primary sector.
Static models of this type provide no explanation of cyclical unemployment.
They generally produce an overall tendency for real wages to be sticky oreven
constant (Solow 1979).
Efficiency wages, like the market-clearing wages they exceed, are unob-
servable; hence there is, understandably, no direct knowledge oftheir empiri-
cal importance. It is also difficult to define the primary and secondary sectors,
since industries and occupations generally overlap both. The level of wages
paid perhaps constitutes the main measurable distinction between the two sec-
tors (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Lang and Leonard 1987).
Consequently, the evidence bearing on these theories is indirect; it is also
limited and mixed. The observed relatively large and stable interindustry
wage differentials may provide support for the efficient wage models (as ar-
gued in Krueger and Summers 1987, 1988) or they may be due to unobserved
quality differences across workers (Murphy and Topel 1987, 1989).6 Some
labor market statistics appear to contradict the hypothesis that hiring from a
queue of long-waiting jobless searchers is particularly important in the pri-
mary as distinct from the secondary labor market. 7 Also, it is commonly ob-
served that people look for better jobs while employed and do not deem it
5. Direct and complete bonding is apparently rare, perhaps because oflimited ability orwilling-
ness to borrow, mistrust between the parties, etc., but there are practical alternatives observed in
long-term employment relationships. Workers may in effect buy responsible high-paying jobs
gradually, by initially accepting low wages for simple, easily monitored tasks and then proving
themselves and advancing along the job ladders within the firm. Participation in costs ofspecific
training programs and nonvested pension plans can also be interpreted as forms of bonding. On
the role ofseniority wages to solve the incentive problem, see Lazear 1981.
6. It is agreed that heterogeneity oflabor, differentials compensating for nonwage aspects ofthe
industry, and institutional factors such as unionization account for a substantial part of the wage
structure, but the unexplained remainder appears to be large.
7 According to data for men who changed employers and industry or occupation between any
successive years in 1977-83, 23.7% ofnew hires in high-wage industries and 29.5% in low-wage
industries experienced unemployment spells (averaging 3.0and 3.6 weeks, respectively) between
jobs (see Murphy and Topel 1988, table 2 and text).132 Chapter Four
necessary to quit in order to search more efficiently. It is unsatisfactory for a
theory to rely on assuming the opposite.
Shifts in the aggregate demand for output and in the derived demand for
labor presumably have less effect on the efficiency wage than on the com-
pletely flexible market-clearing wage. This suggests that employment and un-
employment should be more demand sensitive, and probably more cyclical,
in the primary than in the secondary sector. Other considerations point in the
same direction. Primary workers have large amounts ofhuman capital, much
of it firm specific; their spells ofjoblessness are likely to be infrequent, con-
centrated in bad times, but also long because they are motivated and finan-
cially able to search extensively. Secondary workers have less human capital
and are less attached to theirjobs, which have relatively low pay and promise;
hence they are unemployed much more often in both good and bad times, but
generally over shorter periods because their incentives and opportunities to
search are limited.
It is difficult to test for such dichotomies because well-matched and suffi-
ciently detailed time-series data on unemployment and wages are lacking.
What is readily established is that both unemployment and average hourly
earnings tend to be relatively high in some major industries (durable manufac-
tures, mining, construction, transportation, and public utilities) and low in
others (finance, insurance, and real estate; trade; and services). In industries
where unemployment is on average higher, it also tends to fluctuate more be-
tween business cycle turns and be more volatile. Where earnings are on aver-
age higher, they also tend to be more variable over time. Measures of cycli-
cality and volatility of unemployment numbers and rates are positively
correlated with both the average levels and standard deviations ofearnings by
industry. 8
These findings are broadly consistent with the notion that the high-wage
sectors should display high cyclical sensitivity, but they also point to several
problems and ambiguities. Should the positive relationship between the level
and variability ofaverage hourly earnings be confirmed by a detailed analysis,
this would be difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that higher wages are
the sticky efficiency wages. The high-wage industries may be associated with
more cyclical unemployment for reasons other than those advanced by the
sticky-wage theory, including the reverse-causation argument that higher
wages are paid in part because ofthe greater instability ofemployment. More-
over, there are some well-known factors that help explain the interindustry
8. Fordata on unemployment and average hourly earnings in private nonagricultural industries,
1964-82 (from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, various bulletins), the correlations between the
mean levels and standard deviations are .94 for earnings and .82 for the unemployment rates. The
correlations across these measures between earnings and unemployment rates and also between
cyclical amplitudes ofunemployment and the average levels or variability ofearnings have a range
of .62-.75. For the underlying detailed measures, see Zarnowitz 1989a, table 2.133 Cyclical Aspects of Cost and Price Movements
differences in sensitivity to business cycles, notably the durability and stora-
bility ofproducts.
4.2.3 The Role of Long-Term Labor Contracts
Explicit employment arrangements or contracts cover a large proportion of
workers who stay on the job, particularly those organized in labor unions.
Presumably much more widespread, however, are implicit contracts that ben-
efit the firm and its work force and are therefore, as long as they are so per-
ceived, complied with by both, despite the absence of express, legally en-
forceable agreements. For example, firms routinely extend employment and
grant raises from year to year, especially to employees on salaries. There is
evidence that long-tenure career jobs are indeed very important in the U.S.
labor markets today; for example, as shown in Hall 1982, about 40% ofwork-
ers aged 30 and above are likely to hold jobs that will last twenty years or
more. Current compensation for work ofthis type may be viewed as an install-
ment payment on a long-term employer-employee association, and as such its
influence on current employment is apt to be small.
If workers are generally more risk averse than businessmen and have less
access to capital markets, they may in effect wish to buy from firms insurance
against income decreases in bad times in return for smaller increases in good
times (Baily 1974; Azariadis 1975). In the same implicit bargain, the firm is
conceded much latitude in varying the volume ofemployment over time (not
surprisingly, given the normal functions and requirements ofbusiness and the
realization that fluctuations in the demand for the firm's output must be ac-
cepted as exogenous). Both the firm and labor gain if hours and effort rise
(decline) when there is more (less) work to be done. Convincing arguments
attribute considerable efficiency at the microlevel to contracts that include a
variety of risk-sharing arrangements and such devices as temporary layoffs,
overtime pay, and cost-of-living adjustments (see in particular Hall 1980b).
But even optimal contracts are constrained by inevitable gaps and inaccur-
acies of information and cannot allow for all contingencies that are hidden
from foresight in the world of uncertainty. Thus, the early implicit contract
models noted above can account for sticky real wages but not cyclical unem-
ployment. It is not clear why workers should be so strongly concerned about
wage fluctuations but not about the risk ofjob losses during a recession. The
contract theories face various problems related to the observability and verifi-
ability ofthe events covered, the complexity and enforcement ofthe contracts,
moral hazard, and adverse selection. In particular, the more complicated mod-
els with asymmetric information depend on special assumptions on how firms
and workers differ with respect to what they know and what their attitudes to
risk are (Grossman and Hart 1983). Some ofthe more questionable premises
are that generally firms are risk averse, workers are uninformed about the state
ofthe economy, and contracts are effectively explicit but ofshort duration.
Coordination orexternality problems are inherent in systems with imperfect134 Chapter Four
information and incomplete markets. The reason is simple: any change deter-
mined by decentralized decisions of parties to a contract or transaction con-
cerns a relative or real price, since it is made given other prices. Thus nominal
rigidities can arise from real rigidities, no matter what degree of microeffi-
ciency in real terms the implicit contracting may achieve.
It might seem that institutional means or contractual contingency provi-
sions are readily available to reduce the nominal stickiness, at least in wages,
by indexation. But informational lags and errors do not allow a complete wage
indexation in practice. Moreover, to the extent that indexation does produce
an approximately fixed real wage, it aggravates the effects ofreal shocks even
as it reduces those ofnominal shocks, so that, for example, the economy may
suffer less from demand disturbances but more from supply disturbances
(Gray 1976; Fischer 1977c). Also, if indexation is believed to reduce govern-
ment's interest in pursuing consistent counterinflationary policies, the case for
it is at least politically weakened (Fischer and Summers 1989).9
I conclude that the theory of optimal contracting cannot explain cyclical
fluctuations in employment and unemployment. Indeed logically, the more
efficient the contracts are in foreseeing orproviding for contingencies, the less
room they should leave for persistent departures from full employment. But
inefficient labor contracts that incorporate informational asymmetries imply
underemployment or work sharing rather than more layoffs than hires during
business contractions. Simpler models with relative wage contracting (Taylor
1983; Summers 1988) may prove more helpful on nominal rigidities and un-
employment but their consistency with rational expectations and optimizing
behavior continues to be questioned.
4.2.4 A Summary ofWage Hypotheses
Table 4.1 provides for the reader's convenience a synopsis of the attempts
to explain why wages are or appear to be sticky. After the preceding discus-
sion, only two additional points remain to be made.
The first hypothesis is that real wage movements clear the labor market but
are small because the supply oflabor is highly elastic. This is consistent with
the simple competitive model and assumed as a part of the recent theoretical
framework of "real business cycles." It is contradicted by most tests of inter-
temporal substitution of leisure see (chapter 2, sec. 2.4.3) and generally by
microestimates of labor supply elasticities (Pencavel 1986). Some reported
results based on aggregate data show large elasticities (Kennan 1988) but
they depend critically on prior assumptions and are very imprecise (Taylor
1988).10
9. General indexation extending to prices as well as wages presents still otherdifficult problems
such as the choice of a commodity standard or numeraire in proposed monetary reforms (Blan-
chard 1987b).
10. Long time series reflecting the decrease in hours also indicate an inelastic or slightly nega-
tively sloped supply, but postwar time series show substantially higher elasticities, especially for
countries other than the United States (see Greenwald and Stiglitz 1988, pp. 223-29). In part,135 Cyclical Aspects ofCost and Price Movements
Table 4.1 An Outline ofHypotheses about the Apparent Stickiness ofWages
Hypothesis
1. Supply of labor is highly
elastic to transitory changes
in the current and expected
real return on work effort.
2. Long-term implicit labor
contracts ensure flexibility
ofemployment for firms
and stable real wages for
workers.
3. Unions gain for their





4. Each labor group (unionized
or not) protects, and in
particular resists reductions
in, its relative wage. This
induces stickiness in wages
generally.
5. Efficiency wages above the
competitive equilibrium are
paid by firms to attract and
keep high-quality, high-
effort workers and so
minimize unit labor costs.
Critique
Tests do not support the idea that labor supply responds
sensitively to current and expected changes in real wages
and real interest rates. Evidence from panel data suggests
that total labor supply elasticities are small.
Whether motivated by workers' risk aversion or informa-
tional asymmetries, the contract theory contributes to an
explanation of sticky wages but not unemployment. Effi-
ciency ofthe contracts is questioned.
The ability of unions to obtain and keep high wages depends
on the degree ofcontrol they have over the entry into the
work force. The hypothesis attracts more interest in
Europe than in the United States because ofthe greater
power ofEuropean unions, or "insiders."
A wage cut for any individual group may be resented as
unfair and depress worker morale. Coordinated wage cuts
across a decentralied economy are not practicable. A
possible reason for nominal as well as real wage inertia.
Criticized mainly for lack ofroots in optimizing behavior.
There are good reasons for productivity to rise with real
wages, but the validity of the assumed form ofthis
relation is uncertain. The links to relative wages and menu
cost of wage change have some implications for cyclical
unemployment, but most versions and elements of this
hypothesis have none.
Note: See text for more detail and references.
Bargaining between a labor union with a fixed number of members and a
sectoral monopolist can produce a sticky negotiated real wage in the presence
of fluctuations in demand and employment, assuming that the unemployed
members have an altemative source ofincome and that there is little variation
over the cycle in the wage elasticity oflabor demand. Let this situation prevail
in the primary sector, while the competitive secondary sector offers much
poorer jobs at a much lower flexible wage. Then unemployment will consist
ofthose on temporary layoffs from the primary sector and those who wait for
jobs in that sector. A fall in demand during a recession will widen the intersec-
toral wage differential. The models that give these results are worked out in
McDonald and Solow 1981, 1985. Hypothesis 3 in table 4.1 states the rela-
tionship between unions and relative wage rigidity in general terms.
these differences are reconciled by the finding that the supply of labor for secondary workers is
very elastic.136 Chapter Four
4.3 Why Prices Are Sticky; or, How Markets Clear
4.3.1 Competition and Costs
A combination of highly elastic supply and fluctuating demand produces a
condition of relative price stability in equilibrium, which could be mistaken
for a disequilibrium phenomenon ofreal price rigidity. This apparently simple
and attractive theoretical possibility deserves to be considered.
The competitive firm's short-run supply function is horizontal at the mini-
mum of its average variable cost (the threshold of profitable production) but
elsewhere equals the firm's marginal cost (MC) curve, which slopes upward
because of diminishing returns. The firm has strong incentives to operate as
close to the capacity output (where MC rises steeply) as the price will allow.
The supply curve for a competitive industry as a whole will tend to be still
steeper because an expansion ofindustry output is apt to raise input prices and
so shift upward the MC curves ofall firms concerned. This argues against the
hypothesis suggested.
However, it is not only the short-run supply responses that matter here.
Since business cycles consist of movements measured in quarters and years,
during which all factors ofproduction eventually become variable, the analy-
sis should include longer-run responses as well, where the supply elasticities
will tend to be greater. Moreover, even over short periods of time firms will
see some price changes as more "permanent" than others, and may differ in
these assessments, so that what is being observed represents a changing mix
of short-run and longer adjustments. On simple assumptions, notably ofopen
access to given technology, the intermediate-run industry supply curves would
probably be relatively flat in the middle output region and increasingly upward
sloping at higher rates ofproduction, which drive up MC.
It follows that the simple microeconomics of a competitive industry is not
necessarily inconsistent with the story that high supply elasticities prevail for
medium time horizons relevant for the analysis of business cycles. What is
inconsistent with this hypothesis is the notion that sufficiently large demand-
induced fluctuations in output can coexist with stable prices. When high levels
of production are reached in a business expansion, overtime hours of work at
extra pay rates become common and prices ofmany inputs rise sharply; at low
output rates in a business contraction, the average workweek is cut and some
input prices fall. These prices largely originate in competitive markets. They
include the spot market prices ofraw industrial materials known as "sensitive"
and also wages ofsome categories ofunskilled and unorganized workers.
The microeconomic argument in this section abstracts from changes in
money and the general price level. It cannot explain why comprehensive price
indexes seem to have responded less to decreases than to increases in demand
during the recent predominantly inflationary period, in contrast to a more
symmetric cyclical behavior in earlier times. The issue of the source of any137 Cyclical Aspects ofCost and Price Movements
upward or downward price inertia is still open (Cagan 1979; Okun 1981).
Indeed, studies of micro data sets on transaction prices find no support so far
for the existence of either bias (Stigler and Kindahl 1970; Carlton 1986). I I
What they do find, however, is that many industrial product prices remain
unchanged over long time intervals that must overlap business cycle phases.
Thus the evidence in Carlton 1986, 1987 shows average durations of price
rigidity exceeding one year in most cases and two or even three years in some.
4.3.2 Nonprice Market Clearing
Evidence oflong periods ofrigidity in prices ofnumerous diverse products
cannot be reconciled with a competitive model in which price always adjusts
promptly to equate supply to demand. It is simply improbable that both de-
mand and supply schedules do not move or that their shifts persistently offset
each other so as to leave the price unchanged. Some common observations are
also inconsistent with the model ofmarket clearing through price change only:
at times there is unintended inventory accumulation of goods held for sale,
and at times there are queues for goods that are in short supply (so either
sellers or buyers are unsatisfied). These considerations lead naturally to the
question ofwhat mechanisms may help clear markets in addition to price, and
how they are related to the competitive model.
I suggested a long time ago that the endogenously determined delivery pe-
riod variable (k) is an important equilibrating device (Zamowitz 1962).
Prompter delivery enhances the value ofthe product and so raises the quantity
demanded (ordered) per unit of time; it also raises the average cost of the
quantity supplied. This implies, as a condition for profit maximization by the
firm, that
(3) dP-dc= -[(Dk/Dp)-Ckldk=O,
where Dp= aD/ap < 0, Dk= aD/ak <0, and Ck= aC/ak <0 based on the de-
mand function qd =D(P, k) and the cost function c = C(qs, k). For any quan-
tity demanded, say q1, there is an indifference curve in the price/delivery pe-
riod (P, k) space; and for the same quantity supplied, q~, there is an
indifference curve in the cost/delivery period (c, k) space. Joint optimization
ofP and k requires that the slopes ofthese loci be equal, so that
(4) dP/dk = dc/dk and
in conformity to equation (3).
In this simple model, as long as there is some substitutability between P
11. Surprisingly little price-theoretic work seems to have been done in this area. It includes
some studies which show that the asymmetry can result from the pricing behavior of profit-
maximizing firms with some market power, nondecreasing Me functions, and nonincreasing de-
mand elasticity (Kuran 1983, 1986) or from differential effects of inventory and backlog adjust-
ments (see secs. 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 below).138 Chapter Four
and k, the fluctuations of demand will in general be met partly by changes in
price and partly by changes in delivery period, inducing a positive correlation
between the two variables. Any responsiveness of k should make P more
stable over time, but a variety of outcomes is possible, reflecting the charac-
teristics ofthe product and the state ofthe market.
Even a physically identical commodity differs economically to the user de-
pending on the date ofits availability. An impatient buyer will pay a little more
for an earlier purchase but a sufficiently large differential over the expected or
stated future price will cause postponement or placement ofan order for future
delivery. If cost or demand changes today affect both present and future
prices, intertemporal substitution in the use of producer and consumer goods
may increase the equilibrating role ofdelivery lags and reduce that ofcurrent
prices. Thus when demand is elastic with respect to P but inelastic with re-
spect to k, more of the market clearing will be accomplished by variations
over time in k and less by variations in P.
Some industries take or solicit orders in advance of production and hold
large backlogs ofunfilled orders and small or no inventories offinished goods.
Other industries make goods and hold them in finished-goods inventories for
sale. Products that are customized and particularly costly or risky to store tend
to be made to order. There is much evidence that production to order is very
important, especially in manufacturing, and that it is associated with large
fluctuations in backlog-shipment ratios (a measure of k) and relatively small
variability of prices (Zamowitz 1973). Large procyclical movements are also
observed in the index of"vendor performance" based on data on delivery lags
reported by purchasing managers.
Market-determined changes in delivery periods and unfilled orders need not
be indicative of noncompetitive behavior causing excess rigidities in P. In-
stead, their principal explanation, consistent with a high degree of competi-
tion, may be simply that when buyers choose or consent to wait, smaller or
slower price fluctuations are needed to clear the markets (Zamowitz 1973;
Carlton 1979, 1983, 1987). Demand is often more likely to be sensitive to
changes in P than to changes in k. 12
Where inventories of finished goods are held, they absorb the impact of
temporary shifts in demand at least partly, thereby permitting avoidance, re-
duction, or deferral of price changes. However, the production-smoothing
(buffer) role ofinventories seems to be in the main limited to short unexpected
demand shocks. For inventory investment to act as a strong buffer against
longer fluctuations, it would have to be countercyclical, but instead it is on
the whole procyclical and destabilizing as demonstrated, for instance, by the
fact that GNP varies more over the cycle than final sales.
12. However, there is some evidence that unfilled orders tend to be larger relative to shipments
in highly concentrated industries than in less concentrated industries (Zamowitz 1962). This sug-
gests to Scherer (1980, pp. 195-96) that variations in order backlogs are particularly important in
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4.3.3 Some Implications of Market Power
The conventional analysis of imperfect or monopolistic competition is lim-
ited to price-quantity solutions for given cost functions: the firm faces a
downward-sloping demand curve and sets P above MC according to the opti-
mal markup P/MC = 1l/(1 +ll), where II =elasticity of demand. This is a
static theory that assumes full knowledge of demand and cost functions that
firms in dynamic environments do not possess. Reliably estimating the cur-
rent and future values of II is difficult and may not be feasible when demand
is subject to unpredictable fluctuations or when uncertainty obscures the ef-
fects of the firm's own price adjustments on the behavior ofother market par-
ticipants. If the firm knows that P>MC, it will always wish to sell more at
the current price but it may be reluctant to reduce price lest this should fail to
stimulate sales sufficiently and so result in lower profits. 13
Suppose the firm sees the uncertainty associated with price variations as
greater than the uncertainty associated with output variations, which are to
some degree reduced by changes in delivery lags and order backlogs or by
changes in inventories. Then its preferred strategy would be to use price ad-
justments sparingly and conservatively and to rely more on quantity adjust-
ments in response to fluctuations in demand that may prove transitory. 14
Several recent studies (Hall 1986, 1988; Shapiro 1987; Domowitz, Hub-
bard, and Petersen 1988) present estimates of markup ratios P/MC that, for
many diverse industries, substantially exceed the competitive benchmark of
unity. Hall argues that spatial separation and product differentiation result in a
wide dispersion of market power but not of extra profit opportunities. This is
so because high setup, advertising, and fixed costs create much persistent ex-
tra capacity, absorb excess profits, and discourage new entry. In this view,
firms operate most ofthe time above their (large) minimum efficient scales of
production but below the maximum efficient scales, that is, where their MC
curves are perhaps just slightly rising or nearly horizontal. So the observed
stickiness of prices is seen as reflecting the hypothesized stability of costs
under a regime ofmonopolistic competition. Ifboth MC and II were (approx-
imately) constant, firms would have little to gain from active pricing policies.
13. For a firm with some market power, linear demand and cost functions, and a homogeneous
product, there will be more downward than upward price rigidity if the cost of shortages and
stockouts exceeds the cost ofinventory holding, and vice versa (see Amihud and Mendelson 1983;
also Reagan 1982). This is an interesting notion but it remains to be seen how it would fare under
less restrictive assumptions and with recognition of variable delivery periods and the distinction
between made-to-stock and made-to-ordergoods. Thus, since backlogs always exist in production
to order, they are not just an excess-demand phenomenon, and so their treatment as "negative
inventories" is much too limited and potentially misleading.
14. For a development ofthis argument, see Zamowitz 1962, p. 390; and 1973, pp. 301-5. For
a recent formulation of the hypothesis that managers tend to be more uncertain about the conse-
quences of their pricing and wage decisions than about those of their output and employment
decisions, see Greenwald and Stiglitz 1989 (where inventory changes are considered but variable
delivery lags are not). Even when quantity adjustments are otherwise costlier than price adjust-
ments, the uncertainty differential may cause firms to prefer the former to the latter.140 Chapter Four
Data for manufacturing indicate that plant capacities are indeed designed to
meet peak demands and are often much underutilized in cyclical slowdowns
and recessions, even though the minimum efficient scales of operation are
typically not so large. Early postwar and interwar estimates generally showed
short-run MC to be declining or constant and long-run average cost functions
to be falling and hence suggestive of economies of scale. But these regres-
sions, being based to a large extent on observations of low levels of output,
do not rule out rising costs in higher operational ranges, except probably for
public utilities and railroads-industries long regulated as "natural monopo-
lies." 15 Such microstudies can be informative mainly about long-run tenden-
cies in the selected industries. About general dynamics of the behavior of
costs and related variables, there is more to be learned from work on cyclical
movements ofmonthly and quarterly aggregate time series.
4.3.4 Cyclical Changes in Cost, Productivity, and Profits
Several stylized facts established by studies in business cycles can be inter-
preted to favor the idea that MC is rising. In addition to the already noted
cyclical sensitivity of the average workweek in manufacturing, there are the
short but persistent lags ofemployment and the longer lags ofinventories and
unfilled orders, which suggest the presence of important costs of adjustment
in labor input and production, respectively.
Indexes compiled and analyzed by Hultgren (1960, 1965) show that labor
cost per unit of output and total unit cost in manufacturing, 1947-61, often
declined in the late stages ofcontractions and regularly declined during recov-
eries and then rose as expansions matured and at times also rose well after a
downturn. 16 This observed pattern is in a general sense consistent with the
theory of U-shaped curves, since it implies that unit costs fall in the lower
range of output and rise in the higher range, at least near the capacity levels.
But it suggests additional dynamic elements in that the costs appear to depend
on the rates ofchange as well as levels ofproduction.
A decline in unit labor cost takes place when output per hour ofwork rises
faster than the average hourly compensation; a rise occurs when the opposite
happens. The former condition tends to prevail toward the end of a recession
and notably during a recovery and high expansion; the latter condition tends
to prevail in slowdowns and downswings. Labor productivity is basically pro-
cyclical and leading; its largest gains come at cyclical upturns and in recover-
ies when real growth rates are usually very high. On the other hand, wages
15. The verdict ofa comprehensive survey paper by Walters (1963) was that this literature fails
to convincingly refute the classical hypothesis of U-shaped cost curves; for an opposite view, see
Simon 1979. Critics also charged that the techniques used had a bias toward linearity, which was
disputed by the authors (Johnston 1960). Outside the regulated industries, the results are in fact
rather meager and mixed. However, one should also note the findings from estimated production
functions, which tend to provide broader support for constant returns to scale (Jorgenson 1974).
16. For railroads, a much longer record studied by Hultgren showed a stronger tendency for
cost to be inversely related to output (in units ofpassenger and freight traffic).141 Cyclical Aspects of Cost and Price Movements
often increase most in late stages of expansion and near cyclical downturns
when labor markets become tight and output growth slackens. It is then that
unit labor costs (ULC) begin to increase faster than the level of prices of in-
dustrial products. Total unit costs (UC) usually rise even more because ofthe
developing shortages ofraw and intermediate materials-inputs whose prices
are known as particularly sensitive. As a result, markups on ULC and UC (PI
ULC and P/UC), tend to tum down even while sales and output continue to
grow. Profit margins, as inferred from aggregate accounting data, tum down
with a similar early timing.
Figure 4.1 shows the average movements ofULC, the P/ULC ratio, output
per hour, and the corporate profit margin before and during the recessions and
recoveries of 1948-80. 17 Rates ofchange rather than levels are used for labor
productivity and unit costs so as to eliminate the large but uneven upward
trends in these variables. The resulting patterns demonstrate the strong inverse
relationship between the cyclical change in average productivity oflabor and
the concurrent change in average costs of labor (see the left-hand half of the
chart). The markup and profit margin variables are approximately stationary
and here level data are used. The two series show nearly parallel cyclical
movements most of the time, but the relative amplitudes are greater for the
corporate profit margin than for the P/ULC ratio. Profitability responds di-
rectly to changes in productivity and inversely to changes in cost.
For the pre-1948 period, comparable data are not available but there is a
strong presumption that the underlying relationships have a long history. In
1913 Mitchell predicted the sequence of changes in these variables without
the benefit of data (see chapter 2, sec. 2.3.6 above). Hultgren (1950, 1960)
documented with monthly series for 1932-58 that labor productivity led and
ULC lagged in their procyclical movements. Consistent evidence is presented
by Bemanke and Powell (1986) for 1923-29 and 1954-82 and by Klein and
Moore (1985) for several major industrial countries. 18 An old and widely ac-
cepted explanation of why employment varies less than output is that firms
hoard labor in sluggish times to preserve their human capital investments and
because capacity and input adjustments take time and speeding them up is
costly, particularly under uncertainty about demand. This hypothesis can also
account for the tendency ofoutput per hour to lead at business cycle turns.
The support that Mitchell's theory gets from the data, including the
17. The data are quarterly, mostly for the nonfarm business sector, from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics. The BLS series, published since 1972, begin in 1948; they covercosts and profits
per unit ofoutput and also comparable prices received.
The series used in figure 4.1 contain 132 observations each. The nlean duration of the six
recessions in 1948-80 was 11 months, the distance between the vertical peak and trough lines in
the graphs. For each recession-recovery sequence, each of the series was indexed to its level in
the quarter of the business cycle peak and expressed in terms of two-quarter smoothed changes
(following Moore and Cullity 1983, pp. 255-61 and fig. 16-5). The graphs in figure 4.1 represent
averages ofthe resulting patterns. Measures ofintercycle dispersion and inspection ofthe individ-
ual patterns indicate that these averages are fairly representative.
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evidence for the prewar periods, when prices were relatively flexible, suggests
that cyclical variations in costs, margins, and profits deserve much more atten-
tion than they have received in recent literature and that the stickiness ofprices
perhaps deserves much less. It should also be promising to reexamine Mitch-
ell's approach in light ofcurrent ideas (and vice versa). 19
4.3.5 A Summary of Price Hypotheses
The attempts to explain price inertia are summarized in table 4.2. Two of
the five listed hypotheses require some additional discussion. I then close this
section with a summary ofa recent appraisal ofthe theories ofprice stickiness
by business executives.
In oligopoly (hypothesis point 3 in the table), the few sellers know that their
pricing decisions are interdependent and act accordingly. Suppose each firm
expects its rivals to match any price cut it would make but not a price hike,
which means that each firm faces a demand curve that is kinked at the current
price. This describes a situation in which the price would not change in re-
sponse to moderate shifts in cost; it does not explain what the price is or how
it was determined. Much ofthe time oligopolists may simply play it safe and
settle for the implicit collusive outcome of the game. For example, it pays
them to raise their prices simultaneously as soon as they recognize shared
increases in cost or demand. Undercutting the collusive price can be individ-
ually rewarding, but the risks of a price war are large (see Green and Porter
1984; Porter 1985). If each firm is reluctant to move first on the price front,
long periods ofprice rigidity are likely; if price leadership emerges, intermit-
tent industry-wide price changes would be the expected result. The argument,
then, reduces to the already familiar theme that commitments to maintain rel-
ative prices produce nominal rigidities as firms refrain from initiating price
changes. Empirically, the macroeconomic importance ofthe oligopoly case is
at least uncertain (for an attempt at a generalization, see Woglom 1982).
A hypothesis that gained more attention recently relies on monopolistic
competition where firms produce differentiated products and have some mar-
ket power in price setting. Firms have profit functions that are flat at the top,
19. Mitchell viewed business cycles as sustained by self-generated stresses and imbalances (as
did other prominent scholars ofhis era), whereas most contemporary writers assume that macro-
economic fluctuations are caused by exogenous shocks. Thus, Mitchell would agree with the
modem "real business cycle" theorists that changes in productivity are procyclical and very im-
portant, but not that they are exogenous, generalized shocks to technology that on their own
"drive" business cycles. He would clearly disagree with the treatment of the average price-cost
margin as close to constant (which is often found in recent models of wage and price rigidities).
Recent regression estimates ofindustry P/MC markups find mostly procyclical behavior but yield
mixed results (Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen 1986, 1988; Morrison 1988). This suggests that
different market structures can produce different cyclical behavior, which may well be true (e.g. ,
if11 fluctuated procyclically, P/MC should be countercyclical-butthere is no evidence that either
this condition or its opposite prevails). However, these studies use short annual series, which
cannot reveal leads and lags of less than a year's duration and may not be adequate to determine
the cyclicality ofthe markups.144 Chapter Four
Table 4.2 An Outline ofHypotheses about the Apparent Stickiness ofPrices
Hypothesis
1. Marginal cost (MC) tends to
be flat and stable over time;
hence so is the competitive
price P = MC.
2. P > MC by a stable margin
because of monopolistic
competition with flat and
stable MC and constant
elasticity ofdemand.
3. Sticky oligopoly prices
reflect kinked demand
curves and/or desire to
avoid costly price warfare.
4. Nonprice market-clearing
mechanisms reduce the
frequency of price changes
under various types of
market structure.
5. Each price change has a
fixed menu cost, which is
not worth incurring because




Competitive auction markets cleared only by price are costly
to organize and maintain. Most markets deviate from this
model. MC should be rising for the firm in competitive
equilibrium.
MC should be rising at least near capacity (where overtime
payments are common) and is unlikely to be constant over
the large range ofoutput covered by business cycles (BC).
Average cost and profit margins vary during BCs, in part
in offsetting patterns.
Oligopoly prices may be sticky in response to moderate cost
and demand changes, given the uncertainty about rivals'
reactions, but large changes can induce the few sellers to
alter price simultaneously.
Procyclical movements in delivery lags demonstrably help
absorb changes in demand, but the price-smoothing role
ofchanges in inventory is not clear. Factors that may
favor nonprice instruments: intertemporal substitution,
product heterogeneity, advertising, search costs, and
steady customer relations.
The direct menu costs are probably very small and unlikely
to prevent price adjustments in response to large changes
in demand. The less elastic MC and the more elastic
demand, the larger are the costs required to be effective.
Results are uncertain ifprices are initially not in
equilibrium. Indirect costs, such as customer goodwill,
may matter more.
Note: See text for more detail and references.
with zero derivatives with respect to price at the optimum; hence small devia-
tions from the equilibrium price involve only small (second-order) reductions
in realized profits. A firm that believes its price is set about right in relative
terms has little incentive to change it, even when the "menu cost" ofdoing so
is small. Yet the aggregate result ofthe individually rational decisions to keep
prices unchanged is price-level stickiness, which can have large (first-order)
macroeconomic costs. Suppose reduced monetary growth lowers aggregate
demand: ifall firms reduced their prices even slightly, they would collectively
benefit from an increase in real money balances and a decrease in the level of
interest rates. 20
20. On the other hand, a small increase in monetary growth that would leave prices unchanged
(because of menu costs) would have a positive welfare effect in this model by raising output. The
reason for this is that equilibrium output in this imperfectly competitive economy is suboptimal
compared with the competitive model because ofan aggregate demand externality (Blanchard and
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The last model in table 4.2 sums up the menu cost hypothesis in its simplest
form. In short, this model raises the possibility that weak price rigidities (and
wage rigidities; see Akerlof and Yellen 1985) may be associated with strong
fluctuations in output and employment (Mankiw 1985; Parkin 1986). But the
applicability of the idea is still to be established. The costs of producing new
menus or price tags seem trivial, but it is worth noting that price changes,
unlike quantity (output, inventory, backlog) changes, must be publicized. The
costs of calculational inconvenience to customers and possible goodwill
losses may be much more important (Okun 1981; McCallum 1986). If the
total menu costs are small, they may not prevent price adjustments in response
to large shifts in aggregate demand. The less elastic the labor supply and MC,
and the more elastic the demand curves, the larger are the required menu
costs. Finally, the dynamics of the process, about which little is known, de-
pends on whether prices are initially in equilibrium, on the timing and stag-
gering of pricing decisions, and on potentially important nonprice adjust-
ments. Multiple equilibria are possible, which reflects how individual prices
interact and react to changes in the price level (Rotemberg 1987; Blanchard
1987b).
In a very recent study (Blinder 1991), business executives were carefully
interviewed about (1) the extent of the observed price stickiness and (2) the
perceived validity ofdifferent theories ofinfrequent price changes. According
to the preliminary results of this well-designed research project, 55% of the
72 companies interviewed so far "repriced no more often than once a year"
(p. 93). Thus, many prices are indeed "sticky" in the sense of showing rela-
tively infrequent changes. They respond to shifts in demand and cost condi-
tions with lags averaging 3-4 months.
When ranked by the firms, the hypothesis of variable delivery lags (non-
price market clearing) scored best. "Coordination failure"-the idea that
firms wait for others to alter price first-ranked second, cost-based pricing,
implicit contracts, and explicit nominal contracts ranked third, fourth, and
fifth, respectively. The menu costs hypothesis (cost of the price adjustment)
scored still lower, followed by the notion of procyclical demand elasticity.
Five other hypotheses received more rejections than support. They include the
theory that inventories rather than prices are adjusted in response to demand
changes and the theory that both marginal costs and markups are constant over
the business cycle.
4.4 Historical Evidence and Current Theories
The presently popular "rigidity" theories pay little ifany attention to histor-
ical changes in the behavior of wages and prices. This section takes a look at
these changes and asks what lessons history holds for a comparative appraisal
ofthe extant hypotheses. Some international differences are also considered.146 Chapter Four
4.4.1 Nominal and Real Wages in Business Cycles
Measures of aspects ofcyclical movements in several historical time series
of wage earnings and rates in the prewar, interwar, and postwar periods are
presented in table 4.3. The average annual money earnings from wages de-
clined in about half of the business contractions of 1860-1914 and in all of
those of 1920-38, according to the data compiled in Phelps Brown 1968 (lines
1-2). In contrast, they kept rising through the period 1945-60, which wit-
nessed four moderate or mild recessions (line 3). Data for 1889-1914 from
Rees 1961 show that peaks and troughs in annual earnings matched nearly
two thirds of the like business cycle turns of the period, but those in hourly
earnings fewer than half (lines 7 and 8). However, hourly earnings score high
on cyclical conformity in the interwar period, according to both the annual
series from Rees 1960 and the monthly series from Creamer 1956 (lines 9 and
11). The same applies to an index ofmoney wage rates presented in Creamer
1950 (line 12).
The conclusion is that most of the major business downturns and some of
the minor ones have historically been associated with declines in nominal
wage earnings. 21 The comprehensive study by Phelps Brown, which goes
back to 1860 and also covers France, Germany, Sweden, and the United King-
dom, supplies much additional evidence that money wages basically followed
a procyclical pattern of movement in the eight decades preceding World War
II, though skipping many smaller fluctuations.
However, it is clear from all available data that no cyclical declines at all
occurred in any of the comprehensive money wage indicators for the United
States after 1945. Such long and sustained expansions in wage rates and in-
comes, hitherto unprecedented, prevailed concurrently in other major indus-
trialized and market-oriented countries as well, reflecting both the generally
rising prosperity and inflation ofthe postwar era.
The real wage series used in Table 4.3 are estimated by dividing the money
wage series by cost of living or consumer price indexes. Before 1914, more
business cycle turns were matched by like turns in deflated annual and hourly
earnings than in the corresponding nominal data, but the real series had more
irregular timing and smaller amplitudes (cf. lines 1and 4, and lines 8 and 10).
In 1920-38, deflated annual earnings moved in sympathy with all major busi-
ness contractions and recoveries but skipped the smaller cycles, which the
money earnings did not (cf. lines 2 and 5).
In 1945-60 the real series declined only between 1945 and 1947, lagging
behind the business contraction of 1944-46, which marked the reconversion
21. For example, the annual Rees series on hourly earnings shows downward movements in
1893-95,1896-98,1903-4,1907-8,1913-14, 1920-22, 1924-25, 1929-33, and 1937-39 (see
Rees 1961, pp. 33-34; 1960, pp. 2-3). Earlier data in Douglas 1930 are broadly consistent with
these results. The monthly series declined strongly but with long lags in response to the depres-
sions of 1920-21 and 1929-33 and very mildly and sluggishly during and/or after the other busi-
ness contractions ofthe interwar period (Creamer 1950,1956, ch. 5).147 Cyclical Aspects ofCost and Price Movements
from the war to the peacetime economy (cf. lines 3 and 6). The currently
available quarterly Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data on the real hourly
compensation of production (nonsupervisory) workers on private nonagricul-
tural payrolls provide strong, consistent evidence that these real wages did in
fact keep rising throughout the 1947-60 period with its four recessions (line
13). However, the same series shows much less growth and more cyclicality
in recent times; it flattened in 1969-70 and declined mildly but with consid-
erable persistence in 1973-74, 1978-81, and 1983-84, matching five of the
eight business cycle turns ofthe period since 1961 (line 14).
No detrending or differencing operations are needed to answer the question
whether wages had declines corresponding to the contractions as dated by the
NBER. Questions about the degree ofresponsiveness ofreal wages to changes
in employment require more subtle anaiytic techniques. Studies of this prob-
lem, which are generally restricted by the data to very recent and short seg-
ments oftime, produced mixed results. One reason is that the composition of
the work force varies, in part systematically, over the business cycle. Expan-
sions generate more overtime income, and those who change jobs and new
entrants have more procyclical and on the average lower wages than those who
stay on the same job. Hence the net effect of aggregation is a countercyclical
bias, as shown in Bils 1985.
Note also that real wages as discussed so far are money wages deflated by
the consumer price index (CPI), not by the producer price index (PPI) of the
current output oflabor. The wage in terms ofconsumables is ofprime interest
to workers, whereas the wage in terms ofthe products ofwork (product wage
rate) is of prime interest to firms. Producer prices tend to vary more than
consumer prices; if money wages are less flexible than PPI but more flexible
than CPI, then the PPI-deflated real wages could tum out to be countercyclical
or acyclical and the CPI-deflated real wages procyclical. 22
Bemanke and Powell (1986) find that real wages (CPI-deflated) were
weakly procyclical, lagged output significantly in the prewar (1923-39) pe-
riod, and more nearly coincided with output or even led it in some industries
in the postwar (1954-82) period. Product wages (PPI-deflated) led more
often, particularly in the recent era, and had larger and more erratic variations
and some countercyclical tendencies. 23 Both real and product wages were
more serially persistent and less cyclically variable in the postwar than in the
prewar period.
Money wages show long and pronounced upward trends, so an analysis of
22. See also Tsiang 1947 for an early analysis ofthe U.S. interwar data that suggests a similar
distinction between the behavior ofreal wages and that ofproduct wages.
23. The results for product wages presented in Sachs 1980 are generally similar. Geary and
Kennan (1982) report that product wages are not significantly associated with employment in the
United States and other OEeD countries, but this may be due to the noisiness of these relation-
ships in the time domain (as noted by Bemanke and Powell, who find stronger indications of




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the cyclical behavior of their first differences or deviations from trend must
complement the level analysis. Looking at differences between rates ofchange
(last year ofexpansion minus contraction) in the average hourly compensation
in manufacturing, Sachs (1980) finds that they were negative in 13 of 17 busi-
ness cycles between 1890 and 1975. 24 Thus a deceleration of growth or dis-
inflation in wages marked most of the business cycle downturns. Absolute
declines in wages, however, occurred only on five of these occasions, all of
them before World War II. According to these annual data, wage inflation
actually accelerated in the recessions of 1969-70 and 1973-75.
In sum, the study of historical data makes it clear that the inflexibility of
money wages is not a universal law (as some of the recent literature would
suggest) but is essentially a phenomenon of the post-World War II period.
(Much the same statement can be made about the stickiness ofthe price level
in the face ofaggregate demand changes, as demonstrated below.) Real wages
do not conform closely to business cycles but do fluctuate in a predominantly
procyclical fashion. Before 1914 and between the world wars, these move-
ments tended to be somewhat less frequent and smaller than those ofnominal
wages, but the situation has been reversed in the recent era ofpersistent price
and wage inflation.
4.4.2 Trends and Cycles in Producer and Consumer Price Indexes
The main fact about the recent evolution of both wages and prices is that
they ceased declining during the postwar business recessipns; that is, disinfla-
tion replaced deflation. The evidence is substantial and uncontradicted (Cagan
1975, 1979; Zarnowitz and Moore 1'986; chapter 3, this volume). The follow-
ing is a brief qualitative summary of the findings that are relevant here (for
numerical detail, see Zarnowitz 1989b, table 2).
The first 150 years ofU.S. history can be divided into three periods marked
by inflation (associated to a large extent with wars) alternating with three pe-
riods of deflation. The cyclical conformity of prices, as indicated by the per-
centage of business cycle peaks and troughs matched by like turns in the
wholesale price index (WPI), was considerable throughout and, interestingly,
on average higher in the deflationary than in the inflationary periods. When
the trend in WPI was up, the index rose strongly in expansions and fell weakly
in contractions; when the trend was down, the movements in the index were
likewise procyclical, only tilted in the opposite direction. Also, in the former
periods the year-to-year increases in the index were more frequent than the
decreases, whereas in the latter periods the opposite was the case. For the era
1789-1932 as a whole, the decreases were nearly as frequent as the increases.
24. The Great Depression and World War II years are excluded from these measures. Prices and
wages fell in 1929-33 but rose strongly through the rest ofthe 1930s despite high unemployment.
This is widely viewed as anomalous and attributable to special factors, namely the New Deal
legislation, the support and growth ofunions, and later the wartime administrative controls.151 Cyclical Aspects ofCost and Price Movements
The record for the CPI is somewhat shorter but it too leaves no doubt about
the basically procyclical behavior of prices between 1820 and 1932, even on
an annual basis. Again, the distinction between the inflationary and deflation-
ary periods shows up clearly in the data. The frequency ofdecreases in some-
what less here than for WPI.
In 1932-52, a very turbulent age of depression and wars, prices embarked
on a long upward trend but they still declined in two of the three business
contractions, the exception being the recession of 1945, which marked the
economy's reconversion to peacetime. However, in the three following dec-
ades the annual price indexes ceased altogether to decline in response to reces-
sions. Indeed, in 1952-82 for the first time both WPI and CPI rose on average
more in the years ofcontraction than in those ofexpansion.
Monthly data contain more noise than the annual data but also more infor-
mation, particularly on persistence and timing. In 1953-64, 35% of the
monthly changes in WPI were effectively zero; in 1964-76, 19%; and in
1976-88, only 5%.25 Of course, as inflation intensified, there was a steady
rise in the share ofindex increases (from 39% ofthe time in 1953-64 to 74%
in 1976-88), but the share ofdecreases exceeded 20% in both 1953-64 and
1976-88 (it fell to 12% in 1964-76). However, these decreases were sporadic
and did not amount to cyclical movements matching the business contractions
after the mid-1950s. Indeed, in the 1970s the largest rises in the WPI occurred
during the recessions associated with the huge oil price shocks. The reces-
sions did cause some reductions in the rate of inflation but only with consid-
erable lags. The monthly CPI series shows an even greater preponderance of
increases and generally higher inflation rates.
4.4.3 Trends in Unionization and Competition
Wage and price rigidities are by no means universal but they are treated as
such in most contemporary models that try to explain them. We should favor
any theory that can account not simply for the existence of the rigidities but
also for their apparent increase in recent times.
Several ofthe relevant hypotheses assume deviations from the competitive
model in the form of negotiated wages and price setting by firms. Did the
degree of monopoly-of market power of labor and business-rise histori-
cally and produce reductions in wage and price flexibility? There is no clear
and established answer to this broad question, but the issue cannot be avoided.
My reading ofthe literature and evidence suggests that (a) unionization prob-
ably did contribute to the changed behavior ofwages after the Great Contrac-
tion of 1929-33 and in the first two or three post-World II decades and (b) it
is rather doubtful that a general increase in the degree ofmonopoly occurred,
25. It should be noted that the early annual index series carry no decimals. The monthly series
for both WPI and CPI carry one decimal each.152 Chapter Four
although this probably does not rule out the possibility that noncompetitive
practices or conduct became more common.
Unionization
The sensitivity of wages to cyclical changes in unemployment and related
labor market conditions is smaller in the union than in the nonunion sector so
that recessions generally increase the pay advantage of union workers (Rees
1973, chs. 10 and 16; D. J. B. Mitchell 1980, chs. 4 and 6). The rapid growth
in unionization, from 6% of the labor force in 1933 to 27% in 1953, was
naturally associated with large increases in the role, scale, and costs ofcollec-
tive bargaining. Impasses and strikes can be particularly costly to both parties
in a dispute; therefore, long, often 3-year, union contracts became common in
the postwar period.
However, union membership in the United States has fallen as a share of
the total labor force since the mid-1950s and in absolute numbers since the
mid-1970s, despite a rise in the public sector. Employer resistance to unions
stiffened as growth rates of output and labor productivity declined and com-
petition intensified internationally (Freeman 1988; Reder 1988). Wages and
benefits negotiated by major unions grew in 1968-79 at annual rates averaging
nearly 10% for the first year and 7.5% for the second and third contract years,
according to BLS data. During the recession year of 1982, these rates fell
rapidly to about 3% over the life of the contracts, and they remained there
(occasionally even lower) in the ensuing expansion. Correspondingly, real av-
erage hourly earnings and compensation of production workers on private
payrolls grew only weakly and discontinuously in the 1980s.
This remarkable development surely reflected the loss ofeconomic and po-
litical powerofthe unions but also other, partly related and temporary factors:
disinflation, import penetration, and declines or slow growth of some of the
older domestic industries. At the same time, the civilian unemployment rate
in the United States fell from 10.8% in December 1982 to 5.0% in March
1989. In contrast, unemployment rose and remained high in Europe, where
unions are generally much more powerful, despite the concurrent business
expansion. Theories that blame insiders for high real wage rigidity and persis-
tent unemployment gained considerable popularity there, and they are indeed
consistent with many, though by no means all, ofthe relevant facts. 26
26. Lindbeck and Snower (1986) argue that current employees ("'insiders") have the power to
make it unprofitable for the firm to hire potential employees ("'outsiders") at lower wages. Thus
the burden of unemployment falls on the outsiders, while the insiders, who may be protected by
union membership, enjoy both the stability ofindexed incomes and a high degree ofjob security.
A more general theory of hysteresis or high persistence of unemployment is developed in Blan-
chard and Summers 1986, 1987b; for a different view, see Gordon 1987. As noted in Andersen
1989, the union wage theory does not explain why some ofthe Nordic countries, where the share
ofunionized labor is very high, had relatively low unemployment.153 Cyclical Aspects of Cost and Price Movements
Concentration and Market Power
Formidable conceptual, measurement, and aggregation problems beset all
attempts to estimate the extent (and, even more, the trend) of competition
versus monopoly in the economy. Most of the evidence comes from concen-
tration ratios, particularly for manufacturing, but the relationship between
these measures and the degree ofmonopoly depends on the size ofthe domes-
tic market, the importance of foreign competition, the availability of substi-
tutes, and the extent of collusion. Views on the issue have long ranged from
the popular but undocumented belief that competition is steadily and perhaps
strongly declining to the more cautious and supportable suggestion that there
is much stability over time in the aggregate concentration and no clear uni-
directional trend. 27 The share ofthe 100 largest corporations in total manufac-
turing assets moved up from 34% to 42% in 1927-33, down to 38% in 1941,
up from 37% to 46% in 1947-57, and up again from near 45% to 48% in
1966-71 (Scherer 1980, fig. 3.1, p. 48). There is much agreement that close
approaches to both pure competition and pure monopoly are rare, but some
authors stress the prevalence of broadly defined or "workable" competition,
and others stress that of monopolistic competition and oligopoly (cf. Nutter
1951, p. 44, and Scherer 1980, p. 67).
If it were well established that market power increased and competitive
price taking gave way to price setting under conditions ofimperfect competi-
tion, models that rely on monopolistic competition and oligopoly should have
a better chance to explain the apparent rise in price inertia. (As shown in
Carlton 1986, the average length of spells of price rigidity is an increasing
function of industry concentration.) But there is no convincing evidence that
greater monopoly power is what actually distinguishes the last 40 years from
the earlier era. Large corporations setting prices have been around for a long
time. The increasing globalization of markets is an important postwar trend
that presumably has the net effect ofraising the levels ofcompetition and the
importance ofchanges in relative prices and wages.
4.4.4 How to Explain the Observed Changes
The expected consequence of labor's experience in the depressed 1930s
would be an increase in workers' aversion to the risk ofjob losses. This should
have given rise to greater demand for employment insurance than for wage
stabilization. But labor contracts commonly specify basic income to be paid
27. For an early study that encouraged the former thesis, see Berle and Means 1932; for the
latter position, see Stigler 1949 and Nutter 1951. Stigler's judgment was that "competition de-
clined moderately from the Civil War to the end ofthe nineteenth century, and thereafter increased
moderately" (p. 54). Nutter's estimate of the share of manufacturing output accounted for by
monopolistic industries (those with four-firm concentration ratios of50 and higher) was 33% for
1895-1904, and Scherer (1980, p. 68) obtains approximately the same figure for 1963 (the corre-
sponding proportions were 24% in 1947,30% in 1954 and 1958, and 29% in 1972).154 Chapter Four
for work and fringe benefits; they do not ensure tenure. In the postwar era, the
cyclical variability of money wages has practically vanished, but real wages
have stagnated recently for many workers. Moreover, unemployment contin-
ues to have large cyclical swings and it even has a definite upward trend. It is
difficult to see how the implicit contract theory can explain these phenomena.
The idea that above-equilibrium real wages are required to attract produc-
tive and loyal workers should apply better to prosperous than depressed times,
to large established companies with internal labor markets than small firms
with uncertain prospects, and to high-paying career jobs than low-paying
menial jobs. It is possible that the applicability of the efficiency wage theory
increased during the postwar ear, which was one oflong phases ofexpansion,
with strong growth of career employment in the corporate sector and else-
where (government, professions). But this is presently only a vague specula-
tion; in fact, there is as yet little tested knowledge to bear on the validity of
models ofthis type.
Much the same applies to the menu cost theory ofpricing. The overall costs
of changing prices not having been measured, we simply do not know what
they are, how they vary across time and space, and how they compare with
the costs of changing quantities (of output, inventories, backlogs). We do
know that stable prices reduce communication costs to sellers and shopping
costs to buyers, which is conducive to long-term associations between the
transacting parties. Perhaps the importance of such associations in the econ-
omy has increased in recent times but, again, the facts ofthe matter are yet to
be established.
Long and staggered union contracts probably played an important role in
reducing the cyclical variability and increasing the persistence of wages dur-
ing the post-Depression era when the unions were on the rise. Such contracts
can generate complex distributed lags in wages and prices (see chapter 2,
section 2.4.7). But in the second halfofthe postwar period the share oforga-
nized labor in the United States, never very high, was falling. And outside
North America, including countries where unions are very strong, wage ne-
gotiations are mostly annual and/or are centralized or simultaneous (Andersen
1989, pp. 43-44).
A comprehensive theory that can explain the reasons for both the persist-
ence and the evolution of cycles remains a major unaccomplished task. But
when the observed changes that are likely to have contributed to the relative
stabilization ofthe economy in recent times are taken as given, it can be seen
that they are probably also responsible in part for the reduction in the cyclical-
ity of wages and prices. Prices as well as quantities tend to be cyclically less
sensitive for services than for goods (Moore 1983, ch. 12). Hence the large
rise in the relative importance of services will have had the effect of making
the overall cost and price indexes more sticky. As the needs and preferences
ofconsumers and producers grew more diversified and technologies to satisfy
them were being developed, the share ofoutput made to order may well have155 Cyclical Aspects ofCost and Price Movements
increased, too. Ifso, the result would be a greater role for delivery lag adjust-
ments and a smaller one·for price adjustments (perhaps also some reductions
in the overall levels ofmanufacturers' finished inventories and short-term de-
mand uncertainty).
The persistence of inflation in the last four decades should have rationally
promoted indexation of incomes and increased the frequency of individual
prices rises; that is, it probably worked to reduce nominal wage and price
rigidities on the upward side but may have raised them on the downward side.
But all this was apparently consistent with much inertia in the micro price
data.
Concerning relative price adjustments, the effects of government policies
were partly stabilizing and partly interfering and destabilizing. To the extent
that the experience ofgreater macroeconomic stability generates expectations
ofmore ofthe same, the probability that business recessions will remain rela-
tively short and mild increases. Because buyers see less reason to reduce
spending, sellers see less reason to reduce prices of inputs and outputs. But
the optimism can be reversed by shocks or side developments such as the
accelerated inflation in the 1970s, and both positive and negative expectations
can be temporarily self-fulfilling.
In sum, it is not coincidental that the cyclicality of wages and prices de-
clined during the last half-century even while business cycles moderated and
inflation prevailed. But it is still possible that more flexibility would have
helped. Between 1966 and 1980 ULC in manufacturing, which used to fall
during business contractions, experienced only retardations as money wages
rose strongly despite the adverse supply shocks and a decline in the growth
rates of gross productivity of labor (whose procyclical and leading behavior
pattern, however, remained unchanged). So new concern was expressed about
the stickiness of wages, which was linked by some authors to the stagflation
ofthe 1970s (Moore and Cullity 1983; Haberler 1988).
Yet the classical view that more flexibility is always desirable is not univer-
sally accepted. In what follows an opposite hypothesis will be considered.
4.5 Price Expectations and Interest Rates
4.5.1 Expectational and Distributional Effects ofDeflations and Inflations
A macroeconomic model represents flexible prices by a steep, and sticky
prices by a flat, aggregate supply (AS) curve. Ifthe short-term fluctuations in
aggregate demand (AD) are treated as given, the flatter the AS curve is, the
more real activity will fluctuate. Hence, by this simple argument, price flexi-
bility is necessarily stabilizing.
It is possible, however, that the variation ofAD itself is not independent of
the flexibility of wages and prices in general but rather is an increasing func-
tion ofthat flexibility. For this to be so, the expected rate ofprice change (pe)156 Chapter Four
must have a strong positive effect on AD, and the actual price level (P) must
have a weak negative effect. If P declines in a recession, this raises the real
values of the money stock and net wealth of the public and hence acts to
reverse the decline. But ifat the same time pe turns negative (i.e., a deflation
is widely expected), then this would tend to depress AD by causing postpone-
ment ofpurchases. 28
A similar distinction between level and expected-change effects applies to
nominal wages. A reduction in the current wage level relative to the prospec-
tive future wage level would mean lower production costs now and hence
encourage employment and investment, but the anticipation that wage rates
generally will continue to decline would depress expected incomes, demand,
and profitability and result in deferment ofconsumption and investment. 29
A point-counterpoint discussion of these arguments led Keynes (1936, ch.
19) to the conclusion that on balance, there is little to recommend gradual
reductions in money wages as a cure against depression. If prices fell in step
with wages, no advantage oflower real costs w~uld accrue to the employers;
ifprices were destabilized and fell more, conditions would deteriorate further.
Decentralized wage bargaining can alter the relative money wages, not the
overall level ofreal wages.
Moreover, it has long been recognized that when debt contracts are set in
nominal terms, deflation worsens the financial position of debtors by raising
the real value of their liabilities (Fisher 1933; Keynes 1936; Hart 1938; Min-
sky 1975, 1977). Such contracts certainly exist on a large scale in the United
States and many other countries. True, the assets ofcreditors increase in real
value at the same time, but the two effects need not and probably do not offset
each other completely (Tobin 1975, 1980). Debtors spend more than creditors
relative to their respective incomes and wealth (this is why the former borrow
and the latter lend in the first place). Debtors who face increasing threats of
insolvency are apt to curtail their spending sharply, and those who actually go
bankrupt directly cause losses to creditors. In the 1930s, the results probably
included a sharp rise in the real costs of financial intermediation, impeding
the functioning of credit markets and depressing macroeconomic activity
(Bemanke 1981, 1983). Simulations in Caskey and Fazzari 1987 suggest that
a large real-debt effect can make greater wage and price flexibility seriously
destabilizing. 30
28. In the early statement, Patinkin (1948) contrasted the roles ofP and pe under the headings
of static and dynamic analysis, respectively, and noted that the expectational effect, though pre-
sumably temporary, could well prove the stronger in the short run (see also Tobin 1975).
29. Other possible consequences ofwage cuts include, on the positive side, lower interest rates
(through reduced money demand), higher net exports (through reduced costs and greater compet-
itiveness in an open economy), and possibly more business optimism. On the negative side, redis-
tributional effects detrimental to workers and debtors would be likely to diminish aggregate de-
mand.
30. Note that the argument about the depressant effect of a rise in the real burden of nominal
debt and the attendant redistribution of wealth relies on the current movement ofP and not pe. A157 Cyclical Aspects of Cost and Price Movements
In the absence of a general deflation, relative price movements combined
with nominal debt contracting can seriously hurt some industries, occupa-
tions, or sectors, but these are partial difficulties that normally remain con-
tained. The case in point is the experience ofdebt-burdened farmers after the
1981-82 recession when prices of their products and land stopped rising or
fell.
31
Jut as unanticipated deflation shifts income from debtors to creditors, un-
anticipated inflation does the opposite. The associated wealth redistribution
effects are probably substantial, but individual losses and gains largely offset
each other so that the costs to society vary and are difficult to determine
(Fischer and Modigliani 1978). If money wages are sticky, unexpected price-
level rises would reduce real wages and increase output. Ifthere are no nomi-
nal rigidities but people misperceive the absolute for relative price rises, then
unanticipated inflation would also increase output by raising labor supply. 32
Large inflations or deflations of monetary origin are likely to obstruct,
rather than promote, the flexibility ofrelative prices that is instrumental to the
proper functioning of the market economy. Actual wage and price flexibility
being always limited, deflations often aggravated the severe depressions ofthe
past, and inflations (such as the long and uneven one ofthe 1970s) often con-
tributed stresses and imbalances to expansions.
History suggests that what matters is not so much the direction but rather
the size and variability of the general price movement. Large and volatile
changes in the price level are difficult to predict, generate uncertainty, and
adversely affect real economic activity. Evidence for the 1970s, when both
inflation and unemployment rates were rising and inflation was increasingly
variable, is consistent with this hypothesis (see, e.g., M. Friedman 1977;
Makin 1982; also chapter 17). So are, a fortiori, the data for the short but
severe depression of 1920-21, which was preceded by a large inflation and
accompanied for a year by the most conspicuously rapid deflation on record
for the United States (Friedman and Schwartz 1963b, ch. 5). On the other
hand, one can find examples ofmoderate deflation orinflation coexisting with
either high or low real growth rates. 33
failure offoresight is still required, but only one that occurred earlier, at the time when the debts
had been contracted for. The debtors must have failed to anticipate the downturn and decline in P,
which is easy to explain ifthese were rare events.
31. The industry and regional troubles associated with the oil price decline of 1986 constitute
another example.
32. Analogously, surprise deflation has negative effects on real aggregate economic activity in
both those Keynesian theories that have nominal contracts with limited or delayed wage adjust-
ments and those neoclassical theories that assume flexible wages and prices but also incomplete
information.
33. M. Friedman and Schwartz (l963a, pp. 41-42) describe the post-Civil War period 1865-
73 as one ofdeflation in product prices but not money wages, a mild rise in the stock of money,
and a high average rate ofincreases in real income. Zamowitz and Moore (1986, p. 553) compare
some periods of low or negative inflation and relatively high real growth (e.g., 1923-29) with158 Chapter Four
4.5.2 Models with Potentially Destabilizing Price
and Interest Expectations
Taylor (1986a) holds that the postwar improvement in economic stability
occurred despite the greater rigidity of wages and prices, mainly due to
policy-induced reductions in nominal GNP shocks. Monetary authorities react
to rising inflation with tighter policies; this depresses output growth, which in
time reduces inflation. The result has been smaller variances of the growth
rates of output and prices but also greater persistence (serial correlation) of
the fluctuations in both variables.
In contrast, De Long and Summers (1986a, 1986b) argue that at least some
ofthe postwar moderation ofthe cycle is due precisely to the fact that money
wages and prices have become more sticky and persistent. They assume that
the short-run nominal interest rate (i) enters the LM equation, and the real rate
(re= i - pe) enters the IS equation. IS and LM together determine aggregate
demand, while Taylor's model of overlapping wage contracts is used on the
supply side. There is a serially correlated demand shift term but no wage or
price shock. The model implies that increased price flexibility is destabilizing
at the margin over a considerable range of assumed parameter values. Again,
the reason is that output reacts more elastically to pe than to P, but the channel
is reo 34
However, as shown by Driskill and Sheffrin (1986), increasing price flexi-
bility is stabilizing at the margin in systems where fluctuations are driven by
supply shocks (as in contract models with shocks to nominal wages; see Tay-
lor 1979, 1980a). Hence greater price flexibility may simultaneously increase
the output variance generated by demand shocks and reduce the output vari-
ance generated by supply shocks. The former effect will prevail over the latter
in a model in which demand shocks are serially correlated and supply shocks
are not. But the postwarera witnessed some large supply (or price adjustment)
shocks of considerable persistence. It is clear that generally the results will
depend on the mix and correlations ofthe demand and supply shifts.
Further, the assumption of a policy rule that links money supply to the
interest rate leaves no room for any stabilizing role of monetary policy. Yet,
as shown in chapter 3, monetary growth was much less volatile in the post-
World War II era than in the earlier periods and was, moreover, free of the
previously experienced phases of negative values. Policy may deserve some
credit for this development, even if it is to a large extent endogenous (cf. H.
others ofhigh inflation and lower growth (e.g., 1969-81). When inflationary trends prevail, busi-
ness expansions tend to be longer but not necessarily stronger (Zarnowitz and Moore 1986, pp.
525-31).
34. Ifpeople expect disinflation ordeflation (i.e., pe falls orbecomes negative), then so long as
i does not adjust fully, re will increase, lowering real investment and output. Correspondingly.
when pe rises, rewill fall, which raises economic activity. Hence, more price variability causes
more output instability.(5)
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Grossman 1986). The stabilizing potential of flexible prices would be much
enhanced under conditions ofstable growth ofnominal demand in the will-o'-
the-wisp model with optimal monetary policy (S. King 1988).
In basic analytical terms, the short-run relationship between i and P (two
endogenous, simultaneously determined variables) is unstable because it de-
pends on the nature ofthe shifts in, or disturbances to, the system as a whole.
This argument is sufficient to show that there is no simple and definite way to
relate changes in r e to economic fluctuations. Still, even a highly stylized at-
tempt at some quantifiable linkage should be worthwhile. In times when per-
sistent inflation is recognized and expected to continue undiminished, the
simple price adjustment equation
b(Q - Q*)
P=P-I + Q* '
may not be a bad assumption. 35 (Here Q is actual and Q* is potential output;






where di = i - i_I' Following the derivation in Baily 1978 (pp. 42-45), con-
sider an AD shock that raises Q above Q* by a fraction q as money and prices
increase at the equilibrium rate m= p. Then, from equation (5),
(7) p=p+bq,
(8)
and equations (6) and (7) imply that
~i=q(k:b).
Suppose that the deviation ofP from p in equation (7) is anticipated. Then,




And combining equations (8) and (9) gives
d (
ik+ib - bh) re = q h .
When equation (10) is solved for alternative values ofthe parameters (table
4.4), several relationships emerge. First, when inflation accelerates strongly
35. Survey data for 1959-76 indicate that forecasts ofinflation have been on the average closely
related to the most recent observed values ofinflation (Zamowitz 1979).160 Chapter Four
Table 4.4 Hypothetical Responses ofthe Real Interest Rate to a Demand
Disturbance
A. i= .06, k=0.7, C. k=0.7, b=0.2,
h=0.2 B. i= .06, b=0.2 h=0.2
b Llre k h Llre ~re
0 .21 0.7 0.2 .07 .02 -.11
0.2 .07 1.0 0.2 .16 .04 -.02
0.4 -.07 1.5 0.2 .31 .06 .07
0.6 -.21 0.7 0.1 .34 .08 .16
0.8 - .35 0.7 0.2 .07 .10 .25
1.0 -.49 0.7 0.5 -.09 .12 .54
Note: Based on the formula ~re/q = i (k/h + b/h - b); see Baily 1978 and text for the derivation.
A disturbance to AD is assumed to raise output from equilibrium by 1% (q = 1). ~re = change
in real interest; k = income elasticity of the demand for money; h = interest elasticity of the
demand for money; b = coefficient ofthe GNP gap in the price adjustment equation; i = nominal
interest rate.
in response to excess demand as measured by the GNP gap (i.e., b in eq. [5]
is large), dre falls, given the values of i, k, and h. So in this sense greater
price flexibility can be destabilizing in the short run (see pte A of the table).
Second, given i and b, dre increases for higher values ofthe income elasticity
of the demand for money (k) and decreases for higher values of the income
elasticity ofthe demand for money (h). When h is as large as 0.5, changes in
r e are destabilizing (table 4.4, pt. B). Third, at values ofk, b, and h that seem
reasonable (0.7, 0.2, and 0.2, respectively), dre is negative at relatively low
values ofthe nominal interest rate (i) (pt. C). The meaning ofthis is not clear.
The presence of i in equation (10) makes dre dependent on money growth
even in the long run, but the proper focus ofthis analysis is certainly on mod-
erate short-run movements.
The examples suggest that re will change only by small amounts in response
to a rise orfall of 1% in total output: for plausible parameter readings, perhaps
at most by 30 or40 basis points, most likely less. 36 This seems to be a sensible
result that is consistent with much that is known about the behavior ofinterest
rates and price expectations.
On the other hand, the De Long-Summers hypothesis implies that changes
in re strongly influence aggregate economic activity, presumably through their
effects on real private investment broadly defined (J). Since these changes are
generally small, this requires a high elasticity ofJwith respect to re • Although
such a major role for re is consistent with theory, it has not found much sys-
tematic support in the data. Most tests show relatively weak effects ofcost of
36. Baily's own preferred figures correspond to line 2 in part A oftable 4.4.161 Cyclical Aspects of Cost and Price Movements
capital or the real interest rate on business and household real capital outlays,
and some show no significant net effects at all. 37
4.5.3 Interest and Inflation in History
What the expected inflation rates and real interest rates are at any time is
always very uncertain, as indicated by the diversity ofestimates ofpe obtained
from different sources or by different methods (surveys ofconsumers and fore-
casters; inferences from financial and commodity market data; statistical im-
plementation ofthe rational expectations model). Historically, the response of
nominal interest rates to movements in the rate ofprice change has been quite
varied and mostly weak.
Before World War II, inflation and deflation alternated in peacetime expan-
sions and contractions, allowing for longer trends; short-term interest rates
moved procyclically, like wholesale prices but with longer lags, and long-term
rates had much smaller fluctuations (Zarnowitz and Moore 1986, pp. 553-
65). Short rates moved in broad sympathy to the very large waves ofinflation
and deflation during World War I and thereafter through the slump of 1929-
33, but even then their adjustment was lagged and incomplete. The ex post,
observable real rate, r = i - p, was dominated much of the time by short er-
ratic variations; it shows little association with output and other cyclical vari-
ables but a strong negative correlation with inflation (Mishkin 1981b).
The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that most ofthe time people
viewed the price movement at transitory and limited, so that theirexpectations
smoothed out much ofit. Hence, the changes in pe tended to be small and not
persistent so that the re and i values were on the whole close. 38
A markedly tighter relation between i and p arises only in the second half
ofthe 1960s and through the 1970s, a period during which the persistence of
inflation must have become public knowledge. This is shown clearly by the
graphs and correlations in M. Friedman and Schwartz 1982 (pp. 527-46; see
also Summers 1983, pp. 216-25). The real rate rose from negative to high
positive values during the great inflation of this period, which must have
largely reflected the expectational adjustments of i to p. It should be noted,
however, that the relationship weakened again during the following years of
disinflation: r remained high in 1981-85 as i declined much less than p did.
The De Long-Summers hypothesis relies on the "nonadjustment" ofnomi-
nal interest rates; that is, it requires that i respond only sluggishly and incom-
37. The literature is voluminous. For surveys and references see Jorgenson 1971; P. K. Clark
1979; Chirinko 1988. See also the estimates and critique of investment equations in Gordon and
Veitch 1986.
38. That this was so looks particularly plausible for the pre-World War I era ofthe gold stan-
dard, when the long-term rate of price change was near zero (which, incidentally, helps explain
the shape and relatively good fit ofthe original Phillips curve for the United Kingdom; see Phillips
1958 and Barro 1987, ch. 16).162 Chapter Four
pletely to changes in pe. Ifthe response is sufficiently strong, the change in re
will be too small to have much of a destabilizing effect. Thus, the increase in
the promptness and size of interest adjustments during the period of acceler-
ated inflation in the late 1960s and the 1970s should have reduced the appli-
cability ofthe hypothesis. And, according to the theoretical argument already
noted, the same applies to the effects of the supply shocks, which also oc-
curred in the 1970s.
To conclude, the validity of the hypothesis that stickier wages and prices
had a moderating influence on postwar business cycles remains open. It was
neither shown to draw much support from the data nor invalidated. The theo-
retical possibility ofprice flexibility being destabilizing clearly exists, but the
historical importance ofsuch a condition is uncertain.
A more limited hypothesis, which I think is favored by general considera-
tions and evidence, is that only large changes in pe and re associated with
major deflations, inflations, and disinflations have much destabilizing poten-
tial; small and moderate changes, which are far more common, matter little.
4.6 Concluding Observations
The sensitivity of wage and price levels to cyclical declines was generally
greater before than after World War II. The recent era was also one of more
moderate fluctuations in real economic activity and more persistent inflation.
Important structural, institutional, and policy change,s contributed to all three
ofthese concurrent developments. These linkages elude the current analytical
models, which either disregard the evidence on the stickiness of industrial
input and output prices or treat this stickiness as invariable, ubiquitous, and
necessarily symmetrical.
Considerations oflesser risk and cost to long-term transaction partners may
favor nonprice market-clearing devices even under conditions of substantial
competition, as illustrated by the importance of changes in delivery periods
and quality and availability of products. Relative wage cuts are disliked by
nonunionized as well as unionized workers. Uncertainties about the conse-
quences of price changes can deter them even if the direct costs involved are
small.
Imperfections of competition, information, and markets make some wage
and price rigidities inevitable. The departures from flexibility need not always
be destabilizing; indeed, protracted and anticipated wage declines can aggra-
vate demand contractions. But large wage or other cost increases outrunning
productivity gains can also worsen the economy's condition. The strong hy-
pothesis that the increased rigidities actually reduced the instability through-
out the postwar era does not score convincingly against alternatives. The
counterarguments draw support from the increased responsiveness of interest
rates to changes in expected inflation and the importance of supply shocks in
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The destabilizing potential of general price movements is probably nonlin-
ear: great for large and rapid changes and negligible for small and slow
changes. Major deflations of the past had demonstrably strong and adverse
expectational and distributional effects. As the recent inflation accelerated, it
grew increasingly volatile, generated much uncertainty and popular discon-
tent, and led to policy interventions that had disturbing consequences oftheir
own. Moderate fluctuations in the price level or the rate of inflation have not
been shown to be necessarily detrimental to reasonably steady growth in real
activity.